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CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
CONCLUDED BYTHE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES
RAMSES A. WESSEL*
Abstract
The impact of Brexit on the external relations of the EU and the UK runs
the risk of receiving less attention because of the difficult internal
negotiations on the future of the UK-EU relationship. Yet, the legal
complexities related to the fact that the UK will no longer be part of the
EU’s external relations regime are equally challenging, and increasingly
present themselves now that “Brexit day” approaches. The present
contribution analyses the consequences of Brexit for the UK to negotiate
and conclude new international agreements, as well as the impact of the
UK’s withdrawal on existing international agreements concluded by the
EU and its Member States with almost all States in the world.
1. Introduction
Most studies on Brexit, or on withdrawal from the European Union in general,
focus on either the ways in which this can be done, or on the possible future
relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU.1 The same holds true
* Professor of International and European Law and Governance, University of Twente, The
Netherlands. The article was finalized during my stay as a Visiting Fellow at the European
University Institute, Florence. Credits are due to Adam Łazowski as some of the ideas have
been developed together with him in earlier projects. See in particular Łazowski and Wessel,
“The external dimension of withdrawal from the European Union”, (2017) R.A.E- L.E.A,
623–638. Thanks also to the reviewers of this journal for their very helpful comments and
suggestions.
1. See recently some contributions to Closa (Ed.), Secession from a Member State and
withdrawal from the European Union: Troubled membership (Cambridge University Press,
2017); Eeckhout and Frantziou, “Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A constitutionalist reading”, 54
CML Rev. (2017), 695–733; “Editorial comments: Withdrawing from the ‘ever closer union’?”,
53 CML Rev. (2016), 1491–1499; andVan der Wel and Wessel, “The Brexit roadmap: Mapping
the choices and consequences during the EU/UK withdrawal and future relationship
negotiations”, (2017), CLEER Papers. Compare also, inter alia, Tatham, “Don’t mention
divorce at the wedding, darling!: EU accession and withdrawal after Lisbon”, in Biondi,
Eeckhout and Ripley (Eds.), EU Law after Lisbon (OUP, 2012), p. 128; Hofmeister, “Should I
stay or should I go? – A critical analysis of the right to withdraw from the EU”, 16 ELJ (2010),
589; Łazowski, “Withdrawal from the European Union and alternatives to membership”, 37 EL
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for the Guidelines adopted by the EU in relation to the negotiations with the
UK.2 This should not come as a surprise. After all, in relation to Brexit in
particular it is not easy to disentangle a close and long-lasting relationship and
at the same time find ways to hold on to elements of that relationship. Other
contributions in this special issue testify to that.
The focus of the present contribution is on a different dimension of
withdrawal that is less often part of the debate:3 the consequences for
international agreements concluded by the European Union and its Member
States.4 While the external dimension of withdrawal has also been addressed
by others,5 new questions continue to emerge and deserve legal attention.
Prima facie, the situation is clear: from the moment of withdrawal the United
Kingdom will no longer be bound by existing EU agreements with third
countries. However, this is easier said than done and there are many different
types of international agreements; all with their own legal complexities.6
Moreover, EU rules continue to apply to the UK until 29 March 2019, 23:00
GMT7 and both EU law and international law have something to say on the
Rev. (2012), 523; Nicolaides, “Withdrawal from the European Union: A typology of effects”,
20 MJ (2013), 209; Rieder, “The withdrawal clause of the Lisbon Treaty in the light of EU
citizenship: Between disintegration and integration”, 37 Fordham International Law Journal
(2013), 147; Łazowski, “EU Withdrawal: Good business for British business?”, 22 EPL (2016),
115.
2. The various Guidelines are cited infra notes 49 and 51.
3. See e.g. Fabbrini (Ed.), The Law & Politics of Brexit (OUP, 2017). While this volume
contains a chapter on “The UK Trade Regime with the EU and the World”, it does not
specifically address existing and new international agreements.
4. See in general on EU international agreements: Mendez, The Legal Effects of EU
Agreements: Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques (OUP, 2013);
and Wessel, “The European Union as a party to international agreements: Shared competences,
mixed responsibilities”, in Dashwood and Maresceau (Eds.), Law and Practice of EU external
relations – Salient features of a changing landscape (Cambridge University Press, 2008),
pp. 145–180.
5. On the external dimension of Brexit see, inter alia, Bosse-Platière and Flaesch-Mougin,
“Brexit et action extérieure de l’Union européenne”, (2016) RTDE, 759; Odermatt, “Brexit and
international law: Disentangling legal orders”, 31 Emory International Law Review (2017),
1051–1073; Van der Loo and Blockmans, “The impact of Brexit on the EU’s international
agreements”, CEPS Commentary (2016), available at <www.ceps.eu/publications/impact-
brexit-eu’s-international-agreements>.
6. Thus, for instance, the UK is also expected to withdraw from the Agreement on the
European Economic Area (EEA) between the EU (and its Member States) and three EFTA
States, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. See on the legal complexities in this particular
situation, Hillion, “Brexit means Br(EEA)Xit: The UK withdrawal from the EU and its
implications for the EEA”, 55 CML Rev. (2018), 135–156.
7. UK Prime Minister Theresa May said the EU Withdrawal Bill would be amended to
formally commit to Brexit at 23:00 GMT on 29 March 2019 available at <www.bbc.com/
news/uk-politics-41936428>.
CML Rev. 2018102 Wessel
possibilities to withdraw from existing international agreements or to remain
a party.
A first question to be addressed is what the international position of the UK
will be during and after the withdrawal process (section 2). Secondly, the
consequences for existing international agreements (concluded by the EU
only, or by the EU and its Member States together, or by Member States
themselves) needs to be addressed (section 3).
2. External competences of the UK before and after withdrawal
Leaving the EU implies that the international legal position of the UK will
have to be reset and certain dimensions of its statehood will have to be
reactivated. In practical terms, it will no longer be able to rely on the EU’s
expertise in international trade (including in the WTO) and it will have to
seriously upgrade its own delegations in international organizations, in which
it was mainly active as an EU member.8 In other words, in many international
settings the UK will have to face the reality of a major shift, that is the
transition from an EU to a non-EU Member State. This, inter alia, entails that
the UK may have to negotiate a large number of international agreements,
including – or perhaps above all – the so called “EU only” agreements to
which the Member States are not a party in their own right. This section will
briefly highlight relevant elements of the division of external competences,
before analysing the possibilities for the UK to replace the existing
agreements, both during and after the process of withdrawal.
2.1. The division of competences
As indicated above, the United Kingdom will remain an EU Member State
until the formal date of departure.9 This implies, first of all, that all existing
international agreements will remain binding on the UK, either through
international law or through EU law. The EU treaty database currently lists
over 1100 international agreements concluded by the EU and/or Euratom with
countries around the world, ranging from trade and economic issues to human
8. See Kaddous (Ed.), The European Union in International Organizations and Global
Governance: Recent Developments (OUP, 2015); Wessel and Odermatt (Eds.), Research
Handbook on the EU’s Engagement with International Organisations (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2018; forthcoming). See also Bosse-Platière and Flaesch-Mougin, op. cit. supra
note 5.
9. Compare Art. 50(3) TEU: “The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from
the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the
notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the
Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period”.
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rights and the environment.10 The division of competences would usually11 be
reflected in the nature of the agreements: “EU only” agreements (to which the
Member States are not party in their own right) or “mixed agreements” (to
which both the EU and its Member States are contracting parties).12 Secondly,
as an EU member, the UK will remain bound by the division of external
competences as laid down in the treaties and as clarified by the Court of
Justice of the European Union in its extensive case law on this matter.
Students of EU external relations law are very well aware of the fundamental
role this division of competences plays in defining not only to what extent the
EU can fulfil the global ambitions laid down in provisions such as Article 3(5)
and Article 21(3) TEU, but also in clarifying the scope of Member States’
external competences.13 Text books point to the importance of the link
between the internal and the external dimension and the impact of increased
10. See <www.ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do>. The database allows a
search for bilateral or multilateral agreements in relation to the specific activities of the Union.
11. There may be political reasons to come to another conclusion. Thus, in relation to
CETA, EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said: “From a strict legal standpoint, the
Commission considers this agreement to fall within exclusive EU competence. However, the
political situation in the Council is clear, and we understand the need for proposing it as a
‘mixed’ agreement, in order to allow for a speedy signature.” See Commission Press release,
“European Commission proposes signature and conclusion of EU-Canada trade deal”,
available at <www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm>. At the same time,
mixity was avoided for the conclusion of the EU-Kosovo Association Agreement (AA).
Although AAs are traditionally mixed, an EU-only agreement was concluded because several
Member States wanted to avoid a de facto recognition of Kosovo through their national
ratification procedure of the agreement. See Van Elsuwege, “The stabilization and association
agreement between the EU and Kosovo: An example of legal creativity”, 22 EFA Rev. (2017).
12. While the Europa Treaties database does not allow to search for EU-only or mixed
agreements specifically, one study counted 890 bilateral and 259 multilateral international
treaties and agreements which the EU or the EU and the Member States have signed and/or
ratified. Of these, 745 are exclusive EU competence agreements and 230 are mixed agreements.
See Miller, “Legislating for Brexit: EU external agreements”, House of Common Briefing
Paper, No. 7850, 5 Jan. 2017. Post-Lisbon, however, there seems to be a preference for mixed
agreements. Paradoxically, despite the broadening of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP)
in Lisbon Treaty, also all post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have been signed as
mixed agreements. See further Van der Loo and Wessel, “The non-ratification of mixed
agreements: Legal consequences and solutions”, 54 CML Rev. (2017), 735–770, at 739.
13. See recently on the division of competences Garben and Govaere (Eds.), The Division
of Competences Between the EU and the Member States: Reflections on the Past, the Present
and the Future, (Hart Publishing, 2017). Earlier publications include Davies, “The post-Laeken
division of competences”, 28 EL Rev. (2003), 686–698; Dougan, “The Convention’s draft
Constitutional Treaty: Bringing Europe closer to its lawyers?”, 28 EL Rev. (2003), 763–793;
Craig, “Competence: Clarity, conferral, containment and consideration”, 29 EL Rev. (2004),
323–344; Tridimas, “Competence after Lisbon. The elusive search for bright lines”, in
Ashiagbor, Countouris and Lianos (Eds.), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 50–51; Dougan, “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning
minds not hearts”, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 617–703; Claes and De Witte, “Competences:
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internal Union activity on Member States’ possibilities to continue to play an
international role.14 The rationale behind this internal-external connection is
also well known: once the Member States have transferred competences to the
EU in their internal relations, they have become far less interesting partners at
the international level, since they are simply no longer in the position to
negotiate and conclude international agreements on issues legislated
internally at EU level. It is true that areas fully covered by exclusive
competences are rare, but it is equally true that there are not so many areas left
in which the EU members can engage in international commitments while
completely bypassing the EU.15
The EU holds exclusive competences in a number of areas in its external
relations. As recently further clarified by the ECJ in Opinion 2/15,16 the scope
of the Common Commercial Policy is quite broad and most competences in
that area (or related to CCP) are exclusive. The same goes for the Customs
Union. As also further clarified by Opinion 2/15, apart from exclusivity on the
basis of the Treaties (so-called “a priori exclusivity” or “policy area
exclusivity”), exclusivity may flow from the adoption of internal Union
measures and the UK would be excluded from adopting rules which affect
those measures (“conditional exclusivity” or “pre-emption”). Finally,
exclusive competences can occur when absolutely indispensable to achieve
EU Treaty objectives, without there being internal EU measures (“exclusivity
through necessity”).17
As the EU has become a global actor in areas ranging from trade and
investment to development and environment, international agreements
concluded by it cover many areas, either grouped under more general
association or cooperation agreements or provided for in sectoral treaties with
third countries.18 As a consequence, Member States rely on the EU and the
Codification and contestation”, in Łazowski and Blockmans (Eds.),ResearchHandbook on EU
Institutional Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2016), pp. 46–87.
14. See e.g. and much more extensively Van Vooren and Wessel, EU External Relations
Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2014), Chapts. 3–5. See for a
good overview of recent case law: Erlbacher, “Recent case law on external competences of the
European Union: How Member States can embrace their own treaty”, (2017), CLEER Papers,
available at <www.asser.nl/cleer/publications/cleer-papers/cleer-paper-20172-erlbacher/>.
15. For an overview of the areas where the EU remains active, see, inter alia, Keukeleire
and Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, 2014). Yet,
compare De Witte, “Exclusive Member State competences – Is there such a thing?”, in Garben
and Govaere, op. cit. supra note 13, pp. 59–73.
16. Opinion 2/15 on the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the
Republic of Singapore, EU:C:2017:376.
17. See Van Vooren and Wessel, op. cit. supra note 14, pp. 100–102.
18. In many cases, a general framework treaty is supplemented by sectoral agreements of
sorts. For instance, EU-Georgia relations are covered by an Association Agreement
(Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy
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expertise of the European Commission to negotiate and conclude
international agreements. And this is particularly the case in exclusive policy
areas such as trade or fisheries, in which the role of the Member States has
been marginalized. Thus, while individual EU Member States are still full
members of the WTO, most of the actual work is done by the Commission. A
side effect of this shift is that over the years the EU States have lost
considerable expertise in international trade law and have not concluded any
trade agreements in their own right. Not only in the area of trade, but in many
other policy areas, the UK will indeed have no choice but “to take back
control” of its own external competences once there is no longer any division
of competences. Yet, as the following sections will reveal, from a legal
perspective this is easier said than done.
2.2. The competence to negotiate or conclude agreements pre-Brexit
Article 50 TEU falls short in regulating the external effects of an exit from the
EU. One of the questions that is left open is to what extent the UK can already
anticipate its future role as a non-EU country.19 The British international trade
secretary, Liam Fox, is reported to have said that the UK is “discussing the
possible shape of new agreements” with at least 12 countries, adding that
dozens more were prepared to expand their UK trading links.20 And, indeed
media reports indicate the attempts of the UK to discuss its future relationship
with a number of third States.21 Given the fact that the UK will remain
Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, O.J. 2014,
L 261/4). In addition, a list of sectoral agreements concluded between the parties includes, inter
alia, Agreement between the European Union and Georgia establishing a framework for the
participation of Georgia in European Union crisis management operations, O.J. 2014, L 14/2;
Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on protection of geographical indications
of agricultural products and foodstuffs, O.J.2012, L 93/3; Common Aviation Area Agreement
between the European Union and its Member States and Georgia, of the other part, O.J. 2012,
L 321/3; Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the readmission of persons
residing without authorization, O.J. 2011, L 52/47; Agreement between the European Union
and Georgia on the facilitation of the issuance of visas, O.J. 2011, L 52/34.
19. See also Wessel, “You can check out any time you like, but can you really leave? On
‘Brexit’ and leaving international organizations”, 13 IOLR (2016), 197–209. Parts of the
present contribution are based on that short Editorial. Many thanks to Christophe Hillion for the
valuable discussions on the points in this section. The usual disclaimer applies.
20. Henley and Rankin, “Pursuing trade pacts outside EU could mean worse Brexit deal for
UK”, The Guardian, 25 Jan. 2017 available at <www.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/amp.theguardian.
com/politics/2017/jan/25/brexit-deal-uk-eu-trade-pacts>.
21. E.g.: “Washington trade representatives and American industry experts are due to hold
a second round of ‘preliminary scoping discussions’ in London next week, after the first
meetings in Washington in July”. “Trump adviser Ross says UK-US trade deal will mean
scrapping EU rules”, The Guardian, 6 Nov. 2017 available at <www.theguardian.com/business/
2017/nov/06/trump-ross-says-uk-us-trade-deal-eu-brexit-chlorinated-chicken>; “UK and US
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empty-handed if it does not replace the trade agreements it currently has with
third States on the basis of its EU membership, the question has indeed come
up whether the UK can already start negotiating, and perhaps even
concluding, agreements with other States prior to exit day.
Part of the answer may be found in Article 50(3) TEU, which is quite clear
(although phrased a contrario) on the fact that the EU Treaties remain in force
for a withdrawing country until the day of actual exit from the Union.22
Bearing in mind the complexity of withdrawal process, it has been argued that
the Union should develop a special status of a withdrawing country, waiving
some of the obligations linked to membership to allow it to prepare for the
inevitable legal consequences of exit.23 If nothing special is agreed upon, the
UK would continue to lack competence to conclude international agreements
in many areas. Article 2(1) TFEU24 continues to apply, and implies that the
UK will have to respect the division of competences and is refrained from
adopting legally binding acts or conclude international agreements in an area
of EU exclusive competence. The result is that the UK simply does not have
the competence to conclude international agreements in the area of Common
Commercial Policy, or indeed in any other area of exclusive EU competence,
until it formally leaves the European Union.
Also in areas of shared competences the UK continues to be limited by the
rules and principles guiding the division of competences.Again, it is helpful to
make a distinction between different types of competences. In the case of
so-called pre-emptive competences, Member State action is only excluded if
the competence is exercised by the Union. In the case of non-pre-emptive
competences the EU can fully deploy a policy, but exercising its competence
does not exclude Member State action in the same field. In the realm of
external relations good examples include development cooperation and
humanitarian aid. A special shared (or in fact “parallel”) competence exist in
relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but even in
relation to that area it has been argued that Member States are far from free
once the Union has acted.25
to start talks on post-Brexit trade deal”, BBC News, 24 July 2017, available at <www.bbc.com/
news/business-40699978> ; “No free trade deal until Brexit settled, says Australian minister”,
The Guardian, 7 Sept. 2016, available at <www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/07/no-
free-trade-deal-until-brexit-settled-australian-minister-steven-ciobo>.
22. See supra, text at notes 7 and 9.
23. Łazowski, op. cit. supra note 1, 523.
24. “When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only
the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so
themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts”.
25. Hillion and Wessel, “Restraining external competences of EU Member States under
CFSP”, in Cremona and De Witte (Eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional
Fundamentals (Hart Publishing, 2008), pp. 79–121.
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Furthermore, while one could argue that the need for uniformity may be less
pressing in situations where a Member State will be leaving anyway, it is
maintained here that during the period leading up to actual withdrawal, the
United Kingdom remains bound by the principle of sincere co-operation.26 It
is important to underline that even in cases in which Member States do have
some room for external manoeuvre, the principle of sincere cooperation will
have to guide their behaviour. On the basis of this principle “the Union and the
member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out
tasks which flow from the Treaties. … The Member States shall … refrain
from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s
objectives.” (Art. 4(3) TEU). The effects of this principle are well documented
in academic literature and may become particularly relevant in cases in which
we are not dealing with the pre-emption.27 The case law of the Court is quite
clear on, for instance, the scope of the principle of sincere cooperation28 but
one should also remember that this principle works both ways. On the one
hand, it can be relied upon by the European Union to stop the United Kingdom
from engaging in negotiations of trade agreements with third countries. On the
other hand, the same principle may be invoked by the UK arguing that since it
is leaving the Union, there should be a fair degree of leverage and cooperation
granted by the European Union, allowing it to prepare for a new future. We
were confronted with a somewhat similar situation in Case C-45/07
Commission v. Greece (IMO).29 Whereas Greece had violated its duty of
abstention stemming from the pre-emption doctrine, it argued that the
Commission had itself failed in its duty to cooperate loyally with the Member
States by not allowing discussion of Greece’s proposal in the so-called Marsec
committee, a preparatory body within the Union. It thus invoked the failure of
the Commission to fulfil its legal obligation with regard to the scope of Union
law, as defence against its own failure with regard to Union competence. The
26. See also Larik, “Sincere cooperation in the common commercial policy: Lisbon, a
‘joined-up’ Union, and ‘Brexit’”, in Bungenberg, Krajewski, Tams, Terhechte, and Ziegler
(Eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law, (Springer, 2017), pp. 83–110 at
102.
27. See e.g. Neframi, “The duty of loyalty: Rethinking its scope through its application in
the Field of EU external relations”, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 323–359; Van Vooren and Wessel, op.
cit. supra note 14, Chapt. 6.
28. One of the leading judgments was rendered in Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden,
EU:C:2010:203. For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, Cremona, annotation of Case
C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), 48 CML Rev. (2011), 1639–1665; Van Zeben, “The
principle of unity under Art. 10 EC and the international representation of the Union and its
Member States – Case C-246/07,Commission v. Sweden”, (2010) EJRR, 301–305. More on the
(im)possibilities of Member States to be active externally in areas covered by EU law see, inter
alia, Casteleiro and Larik, “The duty to remain silent: Limitless loyalty in EU external
relations?”, (2011) EL Rev., 524–541.
29. Case C-45/07 Commission v. Hellenic Republic, EU:C:2009:81.
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Court’s reply is important in the present context: it held that a breach by the
Commission of the duty of cooperation (still) does not entitle a Member State
to undertake actions which affect rules adopted at Union level.30
Indeed, the rationale for pre-empting Member State action seems to remain
valid in the context of a withdrawing State. In Opinion 1/03 the Court of
Justice held that “ … it is essential to ensure a uniform and consistent
application of the Community rules and the proper functioning of the system
which they establish in order to preserve the full effectiveness of Community
law”.31 The purpose of excluding Member States from acting solely has thus
been to ensure effective application of EU rules through uniformity where the
EU has exercised its shared powers conferred upon it, or where it possesses an
a priori exclusive power.32 Indeed, the duty of cooperation and the principle of
pre-emption are connected: pre-emption ensures application of EU rules
through uniformity, whereas the duty of cooperation seeks to facilitate
effectively attaining EU tasks and coherent EU international action. Phrased
otherwise: when EU competences could be affected, the Member States are
excluded from acting at all.Yet, when the EU Treaty objectives are at stake and
there is some room for manoeuvre, this triggers an obligation of the Member
States and the Union institutions to cooperate loyally.33
Translated to the obligations of the UK in the period between the
notification and exit day, one could argue that there would be some room for
the EU and the UK to jointly seek possibilities to allow the UK to explore
options for future trade deals with third countries as long as EU competences
would not be affected. At the same time, it is clear, that, firstly, the division of
competences, and secondly, the duty of sincere cooperation would entail that
any unilateral uncoordinated actions on the side of the UK run the risk of
being in violation of EU law. At least, one could argue, the principle of sincere
cooperation entails a “principle of unity of representation”,34 leading to a need
30. Ibid., para 26. Nonetheless, the Court did take the opportunity to emphasize the
reciprocal nature of the duty of cooperation. When the Union has an exclusive power, it must
cooperate loyally with its Member States.
31. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, EU:C:2006:81. For an academic appraisal see,
inter alia, Lavranos, “Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention”, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1087–1100;
Kruger, “Opinion 1/03. Competence of the Community to conclude the New Lugano
Convention on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of Judgments in civil and
commercial matters”, 13 CJEL (2006),189–199.
32. Case C-433/03,Commission v.Germany, EU:C:2005:462; Case C-266/03Commission
v. Luxembourg, EU:C:2005:341.
33. See more extensively Van Vooren and Wessel, op. cit. supra note 14, Chapt. 5; and
Neframi, “The duty of loyalty: Rethinking its scope through its application in the field of EU
external relations”, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 323–359.
34. See Case C-246/07, PFOS.
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for the UK and the EU to cooperate whenever third States are approached to
discuss the future relationship.
In addition to all of the above, the United Kingdom will remain bound by
the principle of “primacy”. This doctrine is well developed and established in
the Court’s case law35 and was confirmed quite expressly in the
Brexit-context by the UK’s Supreme Court in theMiller case.36 The latter held
that: “Following the coming into force of the 1972 Act [European
Communities Act] the normal rule is that the domestic legislation must be
consistent with EU law. In such cases, EU law has primacy as a matter of
domestic law ….”37 This primacy has traditionally not been different for
internal or external activities. So, until exit day the UK will have to act upon
the agreed rules and principles of EU external relations law and it will not be
allowed to give preference to its (newly enacted) domestic bills.
All of this will seriously hamper the UK in preparing itself for the
post-Brexit period as we would be dealing with negotiations on topics that are
already covered by existing EU agreements that fall, moreover, largely under
the EU’s exclusive competences. In most cases the UK will simply be
pre-empted from negotiating (let alone concluding) an international
agreement, and will not be able to win any time by already starting formal
international negotiations during the withdrawal talks with the EU.38 Indeed,
35. See further Claes, “The primacy of EU law in European and national law”, in Arnull
and Chalmers (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP, 2015), pp.
178–211; De Witte, “Direct effect, primacy, and the nature of the legal order”, in Craig and De
Búrca (Eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2011), pp. 323–362; Capik, “Five
decades since van Gend en Loos and Costa came to town: Primacy, direct and indirect effect
revisited”, in Łazowski and Blockmans, op. cit. supra note 13, pp. 379–420.
36. R (on the application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union
[2017] UKSC 5.
37. Ibid., para 67, available at <www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0196-
judgment.pdf>. See also Garner, “‘So long (as) and farewell?’ The United Kingdom Supreme
Court in Miller”, European Law Blog, 26 Jan. 2017 available at <www.europeanlawblog.
eu/2017/01/26/so-long-as-and-farewell-the-united-kingdom-supreme-court-in-miller/#more-
3529>.
38. Compare the remarks by HR Federica Mogherini during her visit to the USA: “ … the
UK will stay a Member State of the European Union for another two years at least. This also
implies that it will not be able to negotiate any trade agreement bilaterally with any third country
which is the case of all the Member States, not because we limit our Member States but because
this is the guarantee for all Europeans that we are stronger in trade negotiations, being the
second economy in the world … and because this guarantee is that the benefit of any trade
agreement goes equally to all Europeans without any internal competition so it is a form of
guarantee for all Europeans and it is not a limitation”, EEAS, 9 Feb. 2017, available at
<www.eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20408/remarks-high-representat
ive-mogherini-press-roundtable-during-visit-united-states-america_en>.
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checking out does not imply that the UK is immediately free to go its own
way.39
2.3 What are negotiations?
Article 2(1) TFEU (referred to above) merely seems to relate to the adoption
of acts. While the principle of sincere cooperation may restrict Member States
in affecting Union activities in that area, the question is when that would
actually be the case, also given the fact that the need for uniformity is perhaps
less pressing now that the UK will have another legal regime anyway.
Brexit Minister Davis argued that there is a difference between the
negotiations (which would be allowed) and the actual signing of an agreement
(for which a competence could not exist),40 and in any case claimed that
“preliminary discussions” between the UK and third States should be
allowed.41 In the law of treaties, negotiations are defined as the first phase of
a treaty-making process.42 Negotiations are generally carried out, or at least
initiated, by the executive (that is to say, the Head of State or a minister for
foreign affairs). As recently argued by de Oliveira Mazzuoli: “Negotiations of
a treaty start when the representatives of States meet at a specific place and at
arranged time, for the purpose of studying the possibilities to reach an
agreement in connection with the conclusion of a specific international
instrument in a joint manner.”43 The term “negotiations” can be seen to
include “every action prior to an agreement of any nature, the time of
discussion and the concurrence of wills which will or will not be transformed
into a legal act”.44 This implies that any action by the executive which is aimed
to investigate the possibilities to reach an international agreement could
already be regarded as falling under the umbrella term “negotiations”.
Admittedly, the descriptions do seem to include a certain formalized
procedure, which would exclude fully informal talks preceding actual
negotiations, but it is equally clear that formal talks between government
representatives of the UK and third States with the aim of discussing the terms
of a new agreement would easily amount to a “negotiations”.
39. Compare Wessel, op. cit. supra note 19.
40. Speech by Davies, House of Commons, 2 Feb. 2016 available at <www.parliamentlive.
tv/event/index/bfe52708-fed8-4028-b2b8-aa8831d173cd?in=12:37:34>.
41. See May, “UK will lead world in free trade”, BBC News, 7 Sept. 2016, available at
<www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37291832>.
42. Compare Mazzuoli, The Law of Treaties: A Comprehensive Study of the 1969 Vienna
Convention and Beyond, (Forense, 2016), p. 89.
43. Ibid., loc. cit.
44. Ibid., loc. cit.
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When it comes to EU law one has to note that the Court of Justice has
occasionally been confronted with similar questions. Rather than the
formalities of international negotiations, the impact on EU solidarity seems
key. In Case C-433/03,Commission v.Germany (Inland Waterway), the Court
stated that the adoption of a decision authorizing the Commission to negotiate
a multilateral agreement marks the start of a concerted action triggering the
duty of cooperation.45 In Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), the
Court held that the duty of cooperation was triggered the moment a Member
State acts internationally in such a way that is “likely to compromise the
principle of unity in the international representation of the Union and its
Member States and weaken their negotiating power”.46 And that was in a
situation of shared competence. The moment any (informal) negotiations
between the UK and a third State “reach a minimum threshold of specificity
and could be detrimental to the EU’s own position in these negotiations”47 the
principle of sincere cooperation would be violated.
However, as mentioned before, in the case of Brexit the question of
whether the European Commission has already used its competence is less
relevant as in most cases we are dealing with existing EU agreements with
third countries. Thus, unless a special status is given to it, the UK would run
the risk of violating EU law if talks with third States would be detrimental to
the EU’s own position.
One way out of all this would be if the UK would expressly be given some
leeway in this area. On the basis of Article 2(1) TFEU Member States may act
even in areas of exclusive EU competence “if so empowered by the Union or
for the implementation of Union acts.” On the basis of this, it has been argued
that “authorizing the UK to start trade negotiations with third countries would
be a possibility, especially for the period after triggering Article 50 TEU, but
depends entirely on the goodwill of the EU institutions and the remaining
Member States.”48 This could be done if the UK acts in close cooperation with
the EU and within a given mandate.
From a more practical perspective the question emerges what would happen
if the UK did violate EU external relations law before formally departing from
the European Union. In a legal sense, nothing seems to stand in the way of the
European Commission using its usual armoury of infringement proceedings
based on Articles 258 and 260 TFEU. The same would hold true for the 27
other Member States. The Court, in turn, could use the fast track procedure in
order to render a judgment before the Brexit actually takes place.Yet, in purely
45. Case C-433/03, Commission v. Germany.
46. Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden.
47. As phrased by Larik, op. cit. supra note 26, at p. 103.
48. Ibid.
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political terms, any violation of EU law during the negotiations would most
likely backfire and not help the UK’s position and be potentially detrimental
to the result it aims to achieve.
2.2. Post-Brexit obligations
A final question in relation to the UK’s competences would be to what extent
it would really be completely free to conclude international agreements
post-Brexit. Obviously, as a non-EU Member State, the UK would no longer
be restricted by the division of competences or by any principle guiding the
EU and its Member States’ external activities. Yet, in some situations an echo
of its former membership may still affect the freedom the UK so dearly hopes
for. First of all, the way in which the UK remains connected to the internal
market may have some influence. While most options that are currently
discussed (at least by academics) foresee a clear decoupling between the UK
and the EU, participation in parts of the internal market may lead to (de jure or
at least de facto) restrictions on the substantive issues the UK can agree on in
international agreements with others. Thus, acceptance of EU-standards to
guarantee market access will make it difficult to negotiate completely
different rules for goods or services with third States. Secondly, participation
in external policies, such as the Union’s foreign and security policy, will result
in restraints on the UK’s foreign policies as it will be unacceptable for the EU
and its Member States that the UK participates in Union policies (e.g. in
relation to sanctions or military missions) while maintaining a different
agenda outside those policies. Finally, it is not completely excluded that
certain restraints may still flow from previous arrangements. Increasingly, the
need for transition arrangements is mentioned to allow the UK and the EU to
have more time for the rearrangements. It is thus not to be excluded that the
UK, while being formally out, will still be bound by a number of transitional
arrangements and hence perhaps even by some aspects of the division of
competences.49
Finally, it goes without saying that also post-Brexit the rules and principles
on the division of competences remain intact for the remaining 27 EU
49. In that respect it is striking that neither the European Council (Art. 50) Guidelines of 15
Dec. 2017, nor the “supplementary directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its
withdrawal from the European Union”, adopted by the Council on 29 Jan. 2018, expressly refer
to the external dimension of a possible transition arrangement. However, in the draft withdrawal
agreement released by the Commission on 28 Feb. 2018, TF50(2018)33, some attention was
paid to this, cf. Art. 124 Specific arrangements relating to the Union’s external action.
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Members. This also implies that the exclusive competence of the EU in trade
and other matters prohibits them from engaging in any separate deals with the
UK the moment this would “compromise the principle of unity in the
international representation of the Union”, in the words of the PFOS formula
mentioned above.
3. InternationalAgreements concluded by the EU and its Member
States
Apart from the possibilities to conclude new international agreements, the
question is what will happen to existing agreements, or at least to the position
of the UK in relation to those agreements. The many different types of
international agreements do not allow for a detailed analysis, but many
specific studies have already pointed to the extreme complexities in areas such
as trade or fisheries.50 Furthermore, as for instance pointed out by Odermatt,
the European Council’s Guidelines are far from consistent. On the one hand,
they seem to accept that after withdrawal, “[t]he United Kingdom will no
longer be covered by agreements concluded by the Union or by Member States
acting on its behalf or by both acting jointly.” At the same time, the Guidelines
also set out that “[t]he European Council expects the United Kingdom to
honour its share of international commitments contracted in the context of its
EU membership. In such instances, a constructive dialogue with the United
Kingdom on a possible common approach towards third country partners and
international organizations concerned should be engaged.”51
This section will address the question of the post-Brexit relationship
between the UK and bilateral or multilateral international agreements
concluded before exit-day. A distinction is made between agreements that
were concluded by the EU only (to which the Member States are not a party in
their own right), mixed agreements (to which both the EU and its Member
States are contracting parties), and international agreements concluded by the
Member States, either inter se or with third States.
50. For an analysis of the many existing arrangement in the common fisheries policy, see
e.g. the EP Report “Research for PECH Committee – Common Fisheries Policy and Brexit”,
Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion
Policies, Fisheries, June 2017, available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
STUD/2017/601981/IPOL_STU(2017)601981_EN.pdf>.
51. European Council (Art. 50) guidelines for Brexit negotiations, 29 April 2017, para 13,
available at <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29/euco-brexit-
guidelines/>.
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3.1. EU-only Agreements
Agreements concluded by the EU usually apply to the territories in which the
Treaty on European Union is applied.52 These agreements are not just
concluded in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy,53 but may
also cover trade with key global partners.54 Unless some kind of transitional
regime is agreed,55 the territory of the UK will no longer be covered by the
agreements after Brexit-day. Article 216(2) of the TFEU furthermore makes
clear that international agreements concluded by the EU are (arguably only)
“binding upon the institutions of the Union and its Member States”. On the EU
side the situation is therefore quite clear: international agreements concluded
by the EU are no longer binding on the UK. The latter is neither bound through
EU law (Art. 216(2) TFEU), nor on the basis of international treaty law (Art.
34 VCLT56), although specific situations may occur in relation to certain
AFSJ agreements for which the UK has an opt-out (see further below).57
52. See e.g. Art. 360(1) of the 2014 Association Agreement between EU and Central
American States: “For the EU Party, this Agreement shall apply to the territories in which the
Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are
applied and under the conditions laid down in those Treaties”; available at <www.trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=689>. Or, Art. 52 of the EU-Korea Framework
Agreement: “This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories in which the Treaty
on European Union is applied and under the conditions laid down in that Treaty, and, on the
other hand, to the territory of the Republic of Korea; available at <www.eeas.europa.eu/
archives/docs/korea_south/docs/framework_agreement_final_en.pdf>. Compare also Art. 29
VCLT, which sets out that a treaty is binding on a party in respect of its entire territory.
53. The international agreements concluded under the CFSP may be found in the EU
database. See for a recent example Council Decision (CFSP) of 27 March 2017, concerning the
signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of
Moldova on security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information, O.J.
2017, L 106/1.
54. See e.g. the Agreement between the European Community and Canada on trade in
wines and spirit drinks, O.J. 2004, L 35/3. Similar ones were concluded with the USA in 1994
and with South Africa in 2002. See for other examples the Agreement between the EC and
Australia on trade in wine, O.J. 2009, L 28/3; or the Agreement between the European
Community and the State of Israel on government procurement, O.J. 1997, L 202/85.
55. See also the European Council (Art. 50) Guidelines cited supra note 49. See more
extensively Dougan, “An airbag for the crash test dummies? EU-UK negotiations for a
post-withdrawal ‘status quo’ transitional regime under Art. 50 TEU”, in this Special Issue.
56. Art. 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides: “A treaty does
not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent”. Art. 34 VCLT is
considered a principle of customary international law and is as such also binding on the Union
(Case C-386/08, Brita v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg Hafen, EU:C:2010:91, paras. 40–45).
57. See on the international agreements concluded in the Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice (AFSJ): Matera, The European Union as an international actor in the area of freedom,
security and justice. A legal constitutional analysis (TMC Asser Press, 2018, forthcoming).
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One could perhaps argue that the EU merely concluded the agreements “on
behalf of ” its Member States and that the UK would thus remain bound once
the competences are returned to it. Thus, it has for instance been argued in
relation to the 2014 WTO Government Procurement Agreement – to which
the EU is a party, but the UK is not – that “on leaving the EU, the UK will
succeed to the GPA in its own right, in accordance with rules of customary
international law on the succession of States to treaties, and practice under the
GATT 1947, which ‘guides’ the WTO.”58
Yet, there are some serious flaws in this argument. As a preliminary point it
should be noted that the idea of the EU contracting on behalf of its Member
States is linked to the notion of “succession”. The two notions should be
separated. With regard to the idea that the EU acted “on behalf of ” its Member
States, this idea seems contradictory to the EU’s separate international legal
status and its autonomous position as a global actor. The Treaty on European
Union clearly presents the EU as a separate international actor and over the
years it has been accepted as such (and alongside its Member States) by almost
all countries in the world. Moreover, the text of the agreements does not
indicate the UK (or any other Member State) as a contracting party. In many
cases we are dealing with bilateral agreements and it would be difficult to
simply read “the European Union” as “the United Kingdom” in those cases.
Finally, as also held by Odermatt, with regard to the idea of “succession”, it is
far from clear that international law accepts the succession of international
organizations by former Member States. The Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, for example, applies only “to the
effects of a succession of States in respect of treaties between States” and it is
clear that the EU is not a State.59
In other words, the UK will have to start from scratch, although it may in
some cases aim at what could largely be a copy of the agreements that were
concluded by the EU. This, of course, assumes that the other contracting
parties would agree to such a solution. In fact, this should not be taken as a
given. One thing is to negotiate a trade agreement with the biggest trade block
in the world, quite another to negotiate it with a medium-size country on the
fringes of Europe.60 This is all the more so given the new preference in world
58. Bartels, “The UK’s Status in the WTO After Brexit”, in Schütze and Tierney (Eds.), The
United Kingdom: “Federalism” Within and Without, 2018 (forthcoming; available at
<www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2841747>.
59. Odermatt, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1059. The non-state nature of the EU was confirmed
by the ECJ in Opinion 2/13, ECHR (II), EU:C:2014:2454, para 156.
60. Cf. also Koutrakos, “ … Once the UK relied on the good will of a third country to
extend these deals to a completely new context, it could not be certain that the latter party would
resist the temptation to unravel specific aspects of the deal. It is difficult to envisage, for
instance, the automatic rolling over of an existing trade agreement concluded by the EU without
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trade for big package deals that require big markets to support them.
Furthermore, in some cases copy-pasting existing agreements to adjust them
for the United Kingdom would be less easy than it sounds, as many of the
provisions were tailor-made for the EU-situation and may require
approximation of domestic law with EU acquis.61
One option needs further investigation, and that is the one used in the case
of opt-outs by EU members to certain agreements or arrangements. This
option allows for Member States to be bound by the agreement, not on the
basis of EU law, but on the basis of international law. Examples include
the UK, Ireland and Denmark as regards part of the 2014 EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement,62 the special position of these Member States in
relation to the 2000 trafficking protocol to the Palermo Convention,63 or
Denmark’s position with regard to the 2007 Lugano Convention. The latter in
particular shows that it is possible to conclude an EU-only agreement to which
adjusting the quotas already applicable to trade between the UK and the third country
concerned … the rolling over of existing trade agreements, therefore, would involve
renegotiation of at least some of their provisions”, Monckton Chambers Blog, 6 July 2016
available at <www.monckton.com/brexit-mean-international-trade-agreements/>.
61. See e.g. Association Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part,
and Ukraine, of the other part, O.J. 2014, L 161/3. For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, Van
der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area: A New Legal Instrument for EU Integration without Membership (Brill Nijhoff, 2016);
Emerson and Movchan (Eds.), Deepening EU-Ukrainian Relations: What, Why and How?,
(Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016).
62. Ibid., see the Preamble of the Agreement, “ … CONFIRMING that the provisions of
this Agreement that fall within the scope of Part III, Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union bind the United Kingdom and Ireland as separate Contracting Parties, and
not as part of the European Union. If the United Kingdom and/or Ireland ceases to be bound as
part of the European Union in accordance with Art. 4a of Protocol No. 21 or in accordance with
Art. 10 of Protocol No. 36 on transitional provisions annexed to the Treaties, the European
Union together with the United Kingdom and/or Ireland shall immediately inform Ukraine of
any change in their position, in which case they shall remain bound by the provisions of the
Agreement in their own right… The same applies to Denmark, in accordance with Protocol No.
22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaties”.
63. Council Decision 2006/619/EC on the conclusion of the Protocol by the European
Community, of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime concerning the provisions of the Protocol, insofar as the provisions of the
Protocol fall within the scope of Part III, Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, O.J. 2006, L 262/51. It provides “ … this Decision is without prejudice to the
position of the United Kingdom and Ireland under the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis
into the framework of the European Union and under the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, hence the UK and Ireland are not bound by this Decision to the extent that
it concerns the exercise of an external power by the Community in fields where its internal
legislation does not bind the UK and/or Ireland. This Decision is without prejudice to the
position of Denmark under the Protocol on the position of Denmark … hence Denmark does
not take part in its adoption and is not bound by it”.
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one Member State (Denmark) is a party in its own right (as are Iceland,
Norway, and Switzerland).64 While, in these cases a solution was intended to
be found for EU Member States with opt-outs in certain policy areas, in a
conceptual sense not much seems to stand in the way of exploring this further
for a “full opt-out”.
In any case, the third countries will likely need to be notified of the fact that
their respective agreements will no longer apply to a former part of the “EU’s
territory”.65 And, indeed, the “territorial scope” of international agreements
concluded by the EU is not without significance. In the case of trade or
investment agreements, for instance, a shrinking territory may be particularly
worrisome for a third party, if only because in the case of Brexit, it loses 65
million consumers.66 In addition, with regard to multilateral agreements in
particular, other aspects, including budgetary reallocations, could become
part of the deal.67
64. As Denmark had opted out from the Brussels I Regulation, that Regulation did not apply
on its territory at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement. That is why Denmark is
separately mentioned as a contracting party.
65. Art. 56(2) VCLT would imply giving the respective third parties 12 months’ notice of
the fact that the UK will cease to be a member of the Union and that therefore the agreement
will cease to apply to its territories. As the UK is not a party, the regular
termination/denunciation clauses in these agreements do not apply. For an example of a
termination clause, see Art. 18(4) of the Agreement between the European Union and the
Republic of Niger on the status of the EU mission in Niger CSDP (EUCAP Sahel Niger), O.J.
2013, L 242/2. For an example of a denunciation clause, see Art. 16(5) of the Agreement
between the EU and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia establishing a framework for
the participation of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in EU crisis management
operations, O.J. 2012, L 338/3. Some EU-only agreements even explicitly mention that the EU
can only terminate the agreement “in respect of all its Member States” (see e.g. Art. 8(7) of the
Agreement between the EU and the Commonwealth of Domenica on the short-stay visa waiver,
O.J. 2015, L 173/21). See also Van der Loo and Blockmans, op. cit. supra note 5 for these
examples.
66. International agreements may even have effects beyond the territory of the UK in
Europe. See on the scope of EU law in relation to overseas territories recently Kochenov,
“European Union territory from a legal perspective: A commentary on Arts. 52 TEU, 355, 349,
and 198–204 TFEU”, in Kellerbauer, Klamert and Tomkin (Eds.), The EU Treaties and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary (OUP, 2018) (forthcoming); University of
Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper, SSRN 2017-05, available at <www.ssrn.com/
abstract=2956011>.
67. In the reverse situation, when a new State joins the EU, the effects for third countries are
determined in the accession treaties. See e.g.Art. 6 of theAccession Treaty with Croatia,Treaty
between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom
of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of
Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,
the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic
of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of
Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United
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3.2. Mixed agreements
At first sight, the situation could be easier in the case of so-called “mixed
agreements” (concluded by both the EU and its Member States with one or
more third States or international organizations) as the UK, as one of the
signatories, seems to be a “party” in its own right and bound directly under
public international law.68 Yet, in the case of bilateral mixed agreements in
particular the Member States and the EU are presented as a “team”. This is
often underlined by the preamble, where it provides that the agreement is
concluded between the third country, of the one part, and the European Union
and its Member States, of the other part, jointly referred to as “the Parties”.69
Significantly, several mixed agreements include a clause defining the term
“Parties” as “the Union or its Member States, or the Union and its Member
States, in accordance with their respective competences, on the one hand, and
[the third country], on the other”.70 Furthermore, just as in the case of EU-only
agreements (see above), mixed agreements (again primarily bilateral ones)
often have territorial application clauses defined in terms of the territory of
EU Member States.71
According to Article 2(1)(f)-(g) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT), a State constitutes a “party” to an international treaty so long
as it has consented to be bound by the provisions of that treaty, which
continues to be in force with respect to it and which has not been terminated in
conformity with its own terms or the VCLT rules on the termination of
treaties. While most mixed EU FTAs contain specific provisions for the
termination of their operation, they do not provide for a special termination
clause in case of withdrawal of a State from the EU. For some, this leads to the
conclusion that “the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will not as such affect its
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the
Republic of Croatia concerning the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union,
O.J. 2012, L 112/10. See further, inter alia, Łazowski, “EU do not worry, Croatia is behind you:
A commentary on the Seventh Accession Treaty, (2012) Croatian Yearbook of European Law
and Policy, 1–30, at 32–33.
68. See, inter alia, Hillion and Koutrakos (Eds.),MixedAgreements Revisited: The EU and
its Member States in the World (Hart Publishing, 2010); as well as Heliskoski, Mixed
Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the External Relations of the European Community
and its Member States (Kluwer Law International, 2001).
69. See e.g. the 2016 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), O.J. 2017,
L 11/23.
70. E.g. Art. 55 EU-New Zealand Agreement on Relations and Cooperation O.J. 2016, L
304/1; Art. 34 EU-Canada Strategic Partnership Agreement, O.J.2016, L 329/45 and Art. 482
of the EU-Ukraine AA (cited supra note 61).
71. E.g. the Agreement on the European Economic Area, O.J. 1994, L 1/3, Art. 126.
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capacity as a formal ‘party’ to mixed EU FTAs.”72 Perhaps the better question
is to what extent they will continue to apply to the UK.73
In that respect, it is essential to recall that these are not just international
agreements that the UK entered into individually, despite the remark made by
Advocate General Sharpston that Member States are parties to the agreement
as sovereign States, “not as a mere appendage of the European Union”.74 As
an “integral part of EU law” – in the words of the EU Court – these agreements
are closely connected to other EU legislation and policies. Moreover, many
mixed agreements are concluded without a strict indication of what falls under
EU competences and what is still in the hands of the Member States.75 In fact,
many Council decisions only refer to the participation of Member States in the
agreement alongside the Union,76 or explain in general terms that the
agreement is only concluded insofar as the agreement’s provisions fall under
Union competences.77 To distill the division of competences from the Council
decision adopting the Agreement remains difficult. The Council decisions on
signature and provisional application state that the listed provisions shall only
provisionally apply “to the extent that they cover matters falling within the
Union’s competence”.78 Several Council decisions even explicitly state that
“the provisional application of parts of the Agreement does not prejudge the
72. See also Volterra, “The impact of Brexit on the UK’s trade with non-EU Member States
under the EU’s mixed free trade agreements”, Oxford Business Law Blog, 17 May 2017,
available at <www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/05/brexit-negotiations-series-
impact-brexit-uk’s-trade-non-eu-member>.
73. Ibid., Volterra rightfully draws attention to the distinction between “entry into force”
and “application”. Whilst the “entry into force” and the “application” of a treaty typically
coincide, this does not necessarily have to be the case. While a treaty might be in force between
two or more States, it might not be applicable with respect to a specific Party (ratione
personae), a specific territory (ratione loci) or a set of events situated in time (ratione temporis).
74. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, EU:C:2016:992, para 77.
75. This was exactly what was at stake during the procedure that led to Opinion 2/15 on the
allocation of competences in the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and
Singapore.
76. For example, the Council Decision 2010/48/EC concerning the conclusion, by the
European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, O.J. 2010, L 23/35. It states that “both the Community and its Member States have
competence in the fields covered by the UN Convention. The Community and the Member
States should therefore become Contracting Parties to it, so that together they can fulfil the
obligations laid down by the UN Convention and exercise the rights invested in them, in
situations of mixed competence in a coherent manner”.
77. See e.g. Council Decision 94/800/EC on the conclusion of the WTO Agreement and its
Annexes, which states that these agreements “are hereby approved on behalf of the European
Community with regard to that portion of them which falls within the competence of the
European Community”, O.J. 1994, L 336/2. For a more recent example, see Council Decision
2008/801/EC on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the United Nations
Convention against Corruption, O.J. 2008, L 287/1.
78. Ibid.
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allocation of competences between the Union and its Member States in
accordance with the Treaties”.79 Thus, also the provisional application does
not provide a clear indication of the provisions falling under Union or Member
State competences.80 The same holds true for so-called “Declarations of
competence” that may be attached to an international agreement to give third
parties an indication of the responsible parties on the side of the EU. Both the
dynamic character of the division of competences and the sometimes not very
concrete wording do not allow for too much reliance on these declarations in
defining the exact delimitation.81
One might argue that all of this is no longer relevant since the UK would
become responsible for the entire set of provisions anyway, including the ones
that previously fell under the exclusive powers of the EU. Yet, the problem is
that on the EU-side mixed agreements were concluded by the States as
Member States functioning within the institutional and substantive setting that
governs the status and implementation of international agreements in the EU
and domestic legal orders.82 And, in some agreements “the Member States of
the European Union” are indeed referred to as such.83 Elsewhere we have
argued that the deletion of the UK as a party could lead to a form of
79. See e.g. Council Decision 2016/2232/EU on the signing, on behalf of the Union, and
provisional application of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other
part, O.J. 2016, L 337/1. A similar formulation can also be found in Council Decision
2017/38/EU of 28 Oct. 2016 on the provisional application of the Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and
its Member States, of the other part, O.J. 2017, L 11/1080. The Council and Member States also
adopted numerous Statements and Declarations to the Council minutes in which they
emphasize that the provisional application of the agreement in several areas such as transport
and moral rights does not prejudge the allocation of competences between the EU and the
Member States. On the various statements, see Van der Loo, “CETA’s signature: 38
Statements, a joint interpretative instrument and an uncertain future”, CEPS Commentary, 31
Oct. 2016.
80. In addition, the Council is not always clear or consistent in defining the scope of the
provisional application. For examples and comments, see Van der Loo and Wessel, op. cit.
supra note 12. The lack of a clear demarcation of competences in mixed agreements has been
criticized; see Heliskoski, op. cit. supra note 68, p. 98.
81. See e.g. Council Decision 2017/38/EU cited supra note 79. On Declarations of
competence, see Casteleiro, “EU declarations of competence to multilateral agreements: A
useful reference base?”, 17 EFA Rev. (2012), 491–509.
82. Or, as nicely phrased by Volterra, op. cit supra note 72, “where mixed agreements are
framed as bilateral agreements between ‘the EU party’ and third States, the intention was
presumably to grant benefits to the EU ‘as a whole’ rather than to individual Member States.
Accordingly, the provisions of the FTA might not continue to apply automatically to the UK
ratione personae post-Brexit”.
83. See more extensively Fernekeß, Palevicˇiene˙ and Thadikkaran, “The future of the United
Kingdom in Europe – exit scenarios and their implications on trade relations”, Graduate
Institute Trade and Investment Law, Clinic Papers (2013), p. 49 available at: <www.graduate
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“incomplete mixity”.84 In any case, negotiations will be time-consuming, not
only for the UK but also for all third parties. As most (at least bilateral) mixed
agreements do not contain clauses on the consequences of parties, the consent
of the third State(s) will be needed for the UK to be allowed to withdraw as a
party (cf.Art. 54 VCLT). Unwillingness on the side of other parties may result
in an interesting legal situation in which the UK would not be able to withdraw
under international treaty law, despite the fact that this withdrawal may be
seen as a logical consequence of Brexit under EU law. At the same time, it
would be difficult to force third States to continue to accept the UK as a
partner to an agreement even if this were possible. After all, the very reason
that the signature of the UK was accepted may have been its EU membership.
Finally, for third States, withdrawal from the EU by a treaty partner may form
a fundamental change in circumstances (cf. Art. 65 VCLT).85
Would it be possible for the UK to remain a party to a mixed agreement?
Theoretically this would not be impossible.86 International treaty law is quite
flexible, as long as all parties agree. In any case, a legal instrument (e.g. a
protocol) seems to be required stating that the withdrawing Member State
takes over the rights and obligations it previously had under the agreement as
an EU Member State and that it joins the agreement as a third party. In all
likelihood, this would trigger negotiations to accommodate unforeseen
practical problems. While under Treaty law it would be obvious that such a
legal instrument would need to be ratified by all parties (the EU, its 27
Member States, the third party and the withdrawing Member State), practice
may reveal that these protocols are concluded by the EU alone, following the
example of protocols in the reverse situation, the accession of a new Member
State. It is important to note that the changing status of the UK would change
the nature of a bilateral agreement to a multilateral agreement.87 Finally, in
institute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI/working_papers/CTEI_2013-01_
LawClinic_FutureUKinEurope.pdf>.
84. Van der Loo and Wessel, op. cit. supra note 12, at 748.
85. Yet, see the restrictive interpretation of the principle by the International Court of
Justice: “the stability of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental change of
circumstances be applied only in exceptional cases”,Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary
v. Slovakia) Judgment of 25 Sept. 1997; cf. also Van der Loo and Blockmans, op. cit. supra
note 5.
86. Yet, see the remarks made by Prof. Dashwood in evidence before the UK Foreign
Affairs Committee: “ … take the example of the free trade agreement with South Korea, which
has been very favourable to the UK. The UK will not be able to – well, it could not – stay as a
part. Although it is a free trade agreement, it is still a mixed agreement because it goes a little
further than the core area of the common commercial policy. Nevertheless, I don’t believe that
the UK could retain the rights and obligations that apply to it under the agreement … we would
have to renegotiate”, (2015), Foreign Affairs Committee, “Costs and benefits of EU
membership for the UK’s role in the world”, HC 545, Q219 Q217.
87. Ibid. See also on this point, see Van der Loo and S. Blockmans, op. cit. supra note 5.
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this respect, it should be stressed that international agreements that have not
been ratified by the UK may have to be adapted. While they may already
provisionally apply on the basis of the ratification by the EU, their full entry
into force may depend on the ratifications of all parties.88
With regard to mixed agreements, different considerations indeed apply to
bilateral and multilateral agreements.89 In the case of bilateral agreements
(between the EU/Member States and a third party),90 the UK would cease to
be a party, but this will not happen automatically. The question is whether a
simple notification to third parties would suffice, or whether renegotiations
are in order. It has been argued that “in order to extract itself from a
mixed agreement, the UK will need to repeal its approval act that ratified the
agreement and terminate or denounce the agreement as foreseen in
the agreement’s termination or suspension clause. Contrary to EU-only
agreements, the UK is a contracting party to the agreement for the mixed
elements of the agreement and these termination and denunciation clauses are
applicable.”91 And, indeed, we may very well need arrangements “between
the EU, its 27 remaining Member States and the other contracting parties, and
laid down in a legally binding act”, which as an amendment of the mixed
agreements “may need the consent of all involved and − depending on the
format − possibly even ratification”.92 It is expected that all of this will form
part of the withdrawal agreement, possibly on the basis of transition
provisions.93 It remains important to keep in mind, however, that these
88. This is not an unusual situation for international agreements and applies for instance to
the EU’s FTAs with Peru and Colombia, CentralAmerica, Eastern and Southern African States,
Cameroon, more Southern African States, and most Caribbean countries. See more extensively
on this intermediate situation, Van der Loo and Wessel, op. cit. supra note 12.
89. Ibid.
90. The bilateral nature of these agreements is often underlined by the preamble, where it
provides that the agreement is concluded between the third country, of the one part, and the
European Union and its Member States, of the other part, jointly referred to as “the Parties”.
Significantly, several mixed agreements include a clause defining the term “Parties” as “the
Union or its Member States, or the Union and its Member States, in accordance with their
respective competences, on the one hand, and [the third country], on the other”. See more
extensively Van der Loo and Wessel, op. cit. supra note 12, at 741–742. This has also been
affirmed by the ECJ in Case C-316/91, European Parliament v. Council, EU:C:1994:76.
Interestingly, Art. 1.1 of CETA defines the parties as “the European Union or its Member States
or the European Union and its Member States, within their respective areas of competence as
derived from the EU Treaties (hereinafter referred to as the ‘EU Party’)”.
91. Van der Loo and Blockmans, op. cit. supra note 5.
92. Ibid.
93. See more extensively on the transition arrangements Dougan, op. cit. supra note 55. The
currently available draft Withdrawal Agreement (28 Feb. 2018) pays attention to the external
dimension of Brexit in one provision only, Art. 124, which largely extends the obligations of the
UK (including the duty of sincere cooperation) throughout the transition period (<ec.europa.
eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_agreement.pdf>). It is interesting to
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arrangements cannot simply be done unilaterally, but will have to include the
respective third States.
In the case of multilateral agreements (between the EU, the Member States
and a (large) number of other States), the UK could perhaps remain a party,94
although a notification regarding the changed situation would be required and
an adjustment of some of the commitments could be necessary. Indeed, it
should not be excluded that also in this case the UK’s continued participation
may become subject to negotiations between the EU, its Member States and
third countries (including the UK in a new special position). This may result in
solutions on the basis of, for instance, additional Protocols or by replacing the
UK’s participation in a multilateral mixed agreement by a “UK only”
agreement. For this reason, the withdrawal agreement may perhaps include
some provisions on how to proceed in these situations, including the need for
notifications and other arrangements. A transition period, allowing the UK to
remain covered by certain international agreements for a certain period after
Brexit, could also be envisaged (see further below).95 In any case, it is clear
that also in relation to multilateral agreements, the UK will become
responsible for the implementation of all provisions, including those related to
the EU’s external competences. Depending on the type of agreement, this may
require a number of additional domestic implementation measures as these
will no longer reach the UK through EU law.
3.3. Agreements concluded by EU Member States
A separate category is formed by what we may perhaps term “Member
States-only” agreements. Obviously, Member States have remained “States”
and in areas in which they are still competent to do so, they have continued to
conclude international agreements, either with third States or among
themselves (inter se).96 The EU treaties even expressly mention the
note that in the UK’s version of a possible Withdrawal Agreement, of 20 Feb. 2018, Art. X+3
largely echoes these obligations (<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/682894/Draft_Text_for_Discussion_-_Implementation_Period__1_.pdf>).
94. Cf. Bartels, op. cit. supra note 58, who argues that “the UK already today possesses full
WTO rights and obligations under the WTO multilateral trade agreements, even if these are, at
present, for the most part, exercised and performed on its behalf by the EU.”As indicated above,
the suggestion that the Union merely acts “on behalf ” of the Member States in these situations
seems flawed. Compare also Ungphakorn, “Nothing simple about UK regaining WTO status
post-Brexit”, (2016) ITCSD Opinion, available at <www.ictsd.org/opinion/nothing-sim
ple-about-uk-regaining-wto-status-post-brexit>.
95. See more extensively on the transition arrangements Dougan, op. cit. supra note 55.
96. Cf. De Witte, “Old-fashioned flexibility: International agreements between Member
States of the European Union”, in De Búrca and Scott (Eds.), Constitutional change in the EU:
From uniformity to flexibility? (Hart Publishing, 2000), pp. 31–58.
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competence of Member States to enter into international agreements with
third countries;97 and this competence may also be included in EU secondary
legislation.98 While, prima facie, these agreements are not part of the Union’s
legal order99 and would thus not be affected by the withdrawal of a Member
State from the EU, there may be clear links with EU law. This is particularly
true when Member States are authorized by the EU to conclude international
agreements, for instance in areas in which the EU is exclusively competent,
but for practical reasons not able to exercise this competence.100
Allan Rosas listed four main reasons why some international agreements
do not count the EU among their contracting parties:101 1. many agreements
were concluded by Member States before they became EU members or before
an EU competence in a particular area became clearly established; 2. the
agreement may concern a matter that is still outside an EU competence; 3. the
EU Commission or the Council may prefer, for political or other non-legal
reasons, not to conclude an agreement despite the existence of a Union
competence to do so and, in the case of a multilateral convention, despite the
97. See e.g. Art. 34(2) TEU; Arts. 165(3), 166(3), 167(3), and 168(3) TFEU; and Arts.
191(4), 209(2), 212(3), and 214(4) TFEU.
98. See further below (and infra notes 100 and 102).
99. Indeed, it is generally held that the general rules and principles of EU law are not
applicable to these agreements. See Rosas, “The status in EU law of international agreements
concluded by EU Member States”, (2011) Fordham International Law Journal, 1303–1345, at
1314. Cf. also Case C-533/08, TNT Express Nederland v. AXA Versicherung, EU:C:2010:50.
The Court “does not, in principle, have jurisdiction to interpret, in preliminary ruling
proceedings, international agreements concluded between Member States and non-member
countries”.
100. Examples include the air service agreements, which, after a judgment by the Court,
suddenly proved to be covered by the Union’s exclusive competences, but need time to be
replaced; see Parliament and Council Regulation 847/2004 on the negotiation and
implementation of air service agreements between Member States and third countries, O.J.
2004, L 157/7. Similar situations arose in relation to the bilateral investment treaties (BITs): see
Regulation 1219/2012 of 12 Dec. 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral
investment agreements between Member States and third countries, O.J. 2012. L 351/40-46;
and with respect to European private law: see Parliament and Council Regulation 662/2009 of
13 July 2009, establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements
between Member States and third countries on particular matters concerning the law applicable
to contractual and non-contractual obligations, O.J. 2009, L 200/25; and Parliament and
Council Regulation 593/2008 of 17 June 2008, on the law applicable to contractual obligations
(Rome I), O.J. 2008, L 177/6 and Parliament and Council Regulation 864/2007 on the law
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), O.J. 2007, L 199/40.
101. Rosas, op. cit. supra note 99. See also Schütze, “EC law and international agreements
of the Member States – An ambivalent relationship”, (2006) CYELS, 387; Klabbers, Treaty
Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Van Rossem,
“Interaction between EU Law and international law in the light of Intertanko and Kadi: The
dilemma of norms binding the Member States but not the Community”, (2009) Netherlands
Yearbook of International Law, 183.
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existence in the agreement of a clause enabling an integration organization
like the EU to become a contracting party; and 4. a multilateral agreement may
be closed to EU adherence by limiting the right to adhere to “States”. To
complicate things, agreements can be concluded before and after EU
membership and can, in both cases, be concluded with third countries or
between Member States inter se.
What consequences will Brexit have on these agreements? Specific
references in the treaties to agreements inter se (such as on the Benelux in
Art. 30 TFEU) do not seem to apply to the UK. Yet, some secondary
instruments also allow for specific arrangements between Member States,
despite the fact that a clear link with EU law is maintained.102 A case in point
is also formed by the over 150 intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
Despite the fact that the Commission works hard to make an end to BITs – in
particular now that direct investments are covered by EU exclusivity – these
agreements have not completely disappeared.103 One could argue that,
post-Brexit, the UK as a third State would be free to maintain its 12 existing
agreements with EU Member States.104 While this may be the case for the UK,
it may not be the case for EU Member States. In areas such as air transport,
investments, or specific parts of private law, the intention is gradually to
phase out agreements concluded by Member States, and this will also affect
the UK. Hence, renegotiations may be in order even for these agreements.
Furthermore, the state of European integration may stand in the way of new
bilateral agreements with EU Member States. Thus, it has been argued that
negotiating post-Brexit bilateral arrangements in the area of free movement
with selected Member States may be deeply problematic from the point of
view of non-discrimination and the basic idea of European unity.105
In relation to agreements concluded by the Member States and other third
countries the question may also arise whether they have no effect at all on the
102. Rosas, op. cit. supra note 99, at 1318 refers to the “Brussels I” Regulation (Regulation
44/2001
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters, O.J. 2001, L 12/1), Rome I and II Regulations, cited supra note 100. In addition, some
agreements are concluded outside the Union law framework to promote closer cooperation;
examples include the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 2005 Prüm Convention.
103. See Bungenberg and Reinisch, “Special issue: Legal problems of intra-EU BITs – An
introduction”, (2016) JWT, 871–872, as well as other contributions to this special issue.
104. Rogers, Goodall and Dowling, “Brexit and investor-state dispute settlement”, (2017)
International Arbitration Report, pp. 24–27. The UK has intra-EU BITs with Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia.
105. See Kochenov, “EU citizenship and withdrawals from the Union: How inevitable is the
radical downgrading of rights?”, (2016) University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research
Paper, LEQS Paper No. 111, available at SSRN, <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2797612>.
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Union. After all, “[a]fter 50 years of existence, the EU has engendered a dense
legal order. On occasion, its legislative activity reaches beyond the EU’s legal
space and incidentally affects relations between third parties and EU
members.”106 It is well known that in International Fruit,107 the Court had no
difficulties in accepting a binding effect of the GATT 1947 on the
Community, despite the fact that it was not a party to that agreement. Indeed,
the notion of “succession” played a crucial role in that respect: competences
were fully transferred from the Member States to the Community and this was
recognized and accepted by third States.108 Exceptional as this situation may
be, the question is what the legal and/or practical status is of agreements in
which the UK mainly acted as an “agent” of the Union as (over time) it lost
competences in this area109 as the Union exercised its so-called “normative
control”.110 True, the UK remains a party in its own right, and one might argue
that it simply regains its status as a full party in any practical sense now that it
becomes responsible again in substantive terms. Yet, the implementation of
those agreements was basically done on the basis of EU rules and in close
alignment with EU law and policies. One may think of multilateral
international agreements in the maritime or fisheries area, on the basis of
which the UK is a member of international organizations (such as the ILO or
the IMO) in which it, so far, mainly or partly acted as an agent of the Union. A
recent statement of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
is illustrative in that respect: “In cases where an international organization, in
the exercise of its exclusive competence in fisheries matters, concludes a
106. Licˇková, “European exceptionalism in international law”, (2008) EJIL, 463–490, at
466. This statement is even more pertinent after 60 years of existence.
107. Joined Cases C-21-24/72, International Fruit Company NV and others v.
Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, EU:C:1972:115, paras.14–18; See also Schütze, op. cit.
supra note 101, at 394–99; Van Rossem, op. cit. supra note 101, at 30–31.
108. Rosas, op. cit. supra note 99, at 1326.
109. Remember the importance of the fact that in the ERTA case, the ECJ recognized that
the Member States “acted in the interest and on behalf of the Community.” Case C-22/70,
Commission v.Council (ERTA), EU:C:1971:32, paras. 80–90.And, in relation to the ILO, it held
that competences “may, if necessary, be exercised through the medium of the Member States
acting jointly in the Community’s interest.” See Opinion 2/91, Convention Nº 170 of the ILO,
EU:C:1993:106, para 37.
110. Cf. also Casteleiro, op. cit. supra note 81. This doctrine was mentioned by the
Commission in the discussions on the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations: “ … European Union Member States have transferred competences (and
therefore decision-making authority) on a range of subject matters to the European Union. This
requires special rules of attribution and responsibility in cases where European Union member
States are in fact only implementing a binding rule of the international organization … in other
words, the European Union exercises normative control of the Member States who then act as
Union agents rather than on their own account when implementing Union law.” ILC,
Responsibility of international organizations, Comments and observations received from
international organizations, Sixty-third session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/637, pp. 37–38.
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fisheries access agreement with an SRFC Member State, which provides for
access by vessels flying the flag of its member States to fish in the exclusive
economic zone of that State, the obligations of the flag State become the
obligations of the international organization.”111 While the status of
agreements concluded by the Union may be clear, the question may be raised
to what extent agreements concluded by Member States are (also) part of the
Union’s legal order,112 in which case disentanglement from that order may be
more complex than a withdrawal of a Member State would suggest. It is true
that the situations that come to mind concern multilateral agreements to which
all Member States are a party, but even “UK-only” agreements should not be
a priori excluded. As an example, the UK is a signatory to 84 BITs with other
countries,113 but also the Regulation on Financial Responsibility,114 for
instance, may very well reveal issues arising over the transition, over whether
the EU or UK should bear financial responsibility arising from a dispute
under an international agreement.
A related question concerns the relevance of so-called “disconnection
clauses”, that may have been inserted in multilateral conventions (e.g. the ones
concluded in the framework of the Council of Europe) to ensure that between
EU members the relevant provisions of Union law apply rather than the
provisions of the international agreement.115 These clauses thus regulate
the applicable law between Member States inter se (or between the Union and
the Member States) on issues dealt with by the multilateral agreement. They
are meant to solve potential conflicts between EU law and international law
and preserve the autonomy of the Union’s legal order.The question of whether
and how the UK should be “reconnected” after Brexit seems to be provided by
the clauses themselves, which (in their quite standard form) read like this:
“Parties which are members of the European Union shall, in their mutual
relations apply Community and European Union rules in so far as there are
Community and European Union rules governing the particular subject
111. Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries
Commission (SRFC) (“Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Tribunal”), Advisory
Opinion of 2 April 2015, Case No. 21, para 172 (emphasis added). Compare also Tuerk,
“Liability of international organizations for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing”,
(2015) Indian Journal of International Law, 161–176.
112. Rosas, op. cit. supra note 99, at 1333, pointed to some Council decisions authorizing
Member States to conclude international agreements “in the interest of the Union”.
113. Rogers, Goodall and Dowling, op. cit. supra note 104.
114. Regulation 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014
establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state
dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European
Union is party, O.J. 2014, L 257/121.
115. Cremona, “Disconnection clauses in EU law and practice”, in Hillion and Koutrakos,
op. cit. supra note 68, p. 160.
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concerned and applicable to the specific case, without prejudice to the
object and purpose of the present Convention and without prejudice to its
full application with other Parties.”116
The EU and its Members made clear that the disconnection clause does not
affect the rights of third parties.117
One could argue that post-Brexit, the disconnection clauses will simply no
longer apply to the UK. As a non-EU State, the UK will become bound by the
full range of obligations in the multilateral conventions, irrespective of any
existing EU rules governing the subject, and in many cases UK compliance
with these agreements may need to be based on domestic UK law, replacing
the current EU rules.At the same time, the disconnection clauses seem to have
created two separate sets of rules on the basis of which – in the words of
Cremona – “‘the EC/EU and its Member States’ are to be regarded as linked to
each other rather than completely independent vis-à-vis other Parties.”118 Also
in this case, practice will reveal to what extent the UK can easily shift from
one regime to the other. Ten years ago, the question was already raised
“whether it will always be easy to draw a clear line between ‘legal relations
between EU Member States inter se’, on the one hand, and their relations
towards third States, on the other.”119 Again, it may be difficult to disentangle
the UK from the EU regime and to change the relationship with its former
fellow EU Member States overnight. And, just like the above-mentioned
distinction between EU-only and mixed agreements, also in this case
differences will emerge between areas in which the Member States are still
116. Art. 26(3) of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005,
CETS No. 196. As exemplified by the 2015 Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, the text of a clause may also be more abstract and not refer to the EU expressly:
“This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of a Regional Economic
Integration Organization that is a Party to this Convention, whether adopted before or after this
Convention – a) where none of the parties is resident in a Contracting State that is not a Member
State of the Regional Economic Integration Organization; b) as concerns the recognition or
enforcement of judgments as between Member States of the Regional Economic Integration
Organization” (Art. 26(6)).
117. This is done in an additional declaration, attached to the Convention: “This clause is
not aimed at reducing the rights or increasing the obligations of a non-European Union party
vis-à-vis the European Community/European Union and its Member States, inasmuch as the
latter are also parties to this convention … they will thus guarantee the full respect of the
Convention’s provisions vis-à-vis non-European Union Parties”.
118. Cremona, op. cit. supra note 115, at 171. This idea is supported by the provision in the
mentioned Declaration that “the Convention applies fully between the European
Community/European Union and its Member States on the one hand, and the other Parties to
the Convention, on the other.” (Emphasis added).
119. Licˇková, op. cit. supra note 106, at 486.
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largely in control and areas that have become subject to (almost) complete
harmonization.120
4. Conclusion
This contribution focused on two particular aspects of Brexit: the extent to
which the UK is competent to negotiate and conclude new agreements to
replace the ones concluded by the EU, and the consequences of Brexit for
existing international agreements. The main point was that the UK will have
to start from scratch in re-developing its international relations, as large parts
of it were regulated on the basis of EU external relations law. The existing
division of competences as well as the principles of sincere cooperation and
primacy also make it difficult for the UK to fully prepare future relations with
third States prior to exit day. A special transition arrangement for the UK,
either during or after the negotiation period, may be necessary to solve this
problem.
As to the existing agreements, it was pointed out that with regard to all
existing – EU-only and (bilateral and multilateral) mixed – agreements there
are legal obstacles preventing the UK from simply “taking over”. As rightfully
noted by Volterra, “there is no ‘one-size-fits-it-all’ solution to this problem.
Each mixed EU FTA must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Each is a
separate agreement that needs to be interpreted in accordance with its own
wording, taking into account its specific context, its object and purpose, as
well as any special meaning that the parties might have intended, pursuant to
Article 31 of the VCLT.”121 In most cases renegotiations are in order, or – as
in the case of multilateral mixed agreements – at least notifications to inform
the other parties of a change in the division of competences. Also in the case
of agreements between the Member States, situations may change as the UK
will no longer be bound by the rules restraining cooperation of EU Member
States inter se. As a third State, the UK will most probably occupy a different
position in those frameworks. Many of these issues may be dealt with by the
agreement negotiated between the UK and the Union on their future
relationship. This arrangement could include provisions allowing these
agreements to continue to apply with respect to the United Kingdom for a
120. This complexity is exemplified by the Lugano Convention, which was signed by the
Community alone (following Opinion of the ECJ, 1/03), but nevertheless refers to the fact that,
for EU Member States, internal EU legislation (in casu Regulation 44/2001, cited supra note
102) applies (Art. 64(1)). See further Cremona, op. cit. supra note 115, at 177.
121. Volterra, op. cit. supra note 72.
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specific period during which the UK will have time to rearrange its external
legal relations.
This is not to say that the UK’s external relations regimes will by definition
be very different compared to what it is now. In a substantive manner it may be
possible to copy-paste many of the arrangements that are currently in EU-only
agreements. At the same, there may be possibilities for the UK to align itself
to the EU’s foreign and security policy and to other external policies, and it
may continue to contribute to EU military missions. All of this, however, will
be done as a non-EU member, and the UK will not only have to be ready to
“take back control” in areas in which it was used to leaving international
negotiations and participation in international institutions to the EU, but also
to “give up control” in the institutions of one of the most influential global
actors.
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